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INTRODUCTION
This note discusses the May 2009 decision of the European Court of Justice
(ECJ) in Waterford Wedgwood plc v Assembled Investments (Proprietary) Ltd
(reported as case C-398/07 P, [2009] ECR 00, OJ C 153 (4 July 2009) 6)
under art 8(1)(b) of the Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 on the
community trade mark ((1994) OJ L 11/1 as amended).
A trade mark is registered in respect of particular goods or services in a
speciﬁc class of the trade marks register. Through such registration the trade
mark holder obtains protection for its rights in respect to those goods or
services in the speciﬁed class. It is trite that registered trade marks are
protected from infringement by the use of an identical or a similar mark on
identical or similar goods or services in the jurisdiction of registration. These
are the principles of speciality and territoriality, respectively (Roshana
Kelbrick ‘The new trade-mark infringement provisions: How have the
courts interpreted them?’ (2007) 19 SA Merc LJ 86). Therefore a person can
lawfully use or even register a previously registered trade mark in relation to
different goods or services in a different class. However, in some circum-
stances such use or registration would be detrimental to the rights of the
owner of the earlier trade mark. The law protects the rights of the owner of
the earlier trade mark in those circumstances through remedies for infringe-
ment or registration opposition proceedings.
Article 8(1)(b) of the Council Regulation on the community mark enables
the owner of an earlier mark to oppose the registration of another trade mark
if that second mark is identical or similar to the earlier mark, and the second
mark is intended to be registered in respect of identical or similar goods to
those covered by the earlier mark, resulting in the likelihood of confusion
among the public as to the origin of the goods. In determining an opposition
matter brought under this provision, the courts have to decide three issues.
First, the courts must determine whether the parties’ goods or services are
identical or similar. If they are, the courts must then consider whether the
parties’ marks are similar. Ultimately, if both the goods or services and the
marks are similar or identical, the courts must rule on whether consumers
will be confused about the origin of the goods or services. If the goods or
services are found not to be similar, there is no need to consider the similarity
of the marks or the probability of confusion. The critical issue for trade mark
owners relying on art 8(1)(b), therefore, is to establish the similarity of the
goods or services.
The case under discussion turned on whether wine and wine glasses which
are complementary, are similar. In other words, the main question was
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whether the degree of complementarity between the goods rendered them
similar (Leanne Mostert ‘Raise a glass to the winner’ (2007) 7(6) Without
Prejudice available at http://www.webberwentzel.com/wwb/view/wwb/en/
page1874?oid=15554&sn=Detail, accessed on 22 September 2009).
THE FACTS AND THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE
A South African company, Assembled Investments, applied for a community
mark for its Stellenbosch-produced wines in December 1999 at the Ofﬁce
for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs)
(OHIM). Assembled Investments applied for its mark to be registered in class
33. This trade mark consisted of the words ‘Waterford Stellenbosch’ below a
picture. The composite device is depicted below:
In October 2000, Waterford Wedgwood, an Irish company that produces
glassware, including wine glasses, opposed Assembled Investments’ applica-
tion. It owns the community mark ‘Waterford’, which is registered in class 21
for ‘articles of glassware, earthenware, china and porcelain’ (ECJ judgment
(supra) para 5). Waterford Wedgwood relied on art 8(1)(b) of Council
Regulation (EC) 40/94, which provides:
‘Upon opposition by the proprietor of an earlier trade mark, the trade mark
applied for shall not be registered: if because of its identity with or similarity to
the earlier trade mark and the identity or similarity of the goods or services
covered by the trade marks there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of
the public in the territory in which the earlier trade mark is protected; the
likelihood of confusion includes the likelihood of association with the earlier
trade mark.’
In the alternative, relying on art 8(5) of the regulations, Waterford
Wedgwood argued that allowing registration of the Assembled Investments
mark would enable Assembled Investments to take unfair advantage of its
reputation without due cause. This argument is not discussed in this note
because it was not considered by the courts. The OHIM rejected the
opposition in February 2004, ﬁnding that the complementarity between
wine and wine glasses did not render them similar (ECJ judgment (supra)
para 7). In April 2004 Waterford Wedgwood appealed against the OHIM
decision to the First Board of Appeal of OHIM (ECJ judgment (supra) para
8). The Board of Appeal reversed the OHIM opposition decision after
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ﬁnding that both the goods and the marks were similar, rendering it likely
that there could be confusion under art 8(1)(b). It held that the goods were
similar due to ‘the high degree to which’ they ‘complement each other’ and
that the marks were ‘highly similar on the visual, phonetic and conceptual
levels’ (ECJ judgment (supra) para 9, Board of Appeal decision case R
240/2004-1, unreported). Assembled Investments successfully appealed
against this decision to the Court of First Instance (CFI) (OJ C 170 (21 July
2007) 22). In its judgment of 12 June 2007, the CFI found that wine and
wine glasses were in fact not similar goods, and did not even proceed to
discuss the similarity of the marks (Case T-105/05, unreported, paras 31–35).
It is noteworthy that the CFI emphasised the critical requirement that the
goods or services must be similar or identical to necessitate a comparison of
the relevant marks (CFI judgment (supra) paras 27–8). It then carried out a
comprehensive assessment using the considerations listed by the ECJ in para
23 of Canon Kabushiki Kaisha v Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc (Case C-39/97
[1998] ECR I-5507). Paragraph 23 of Canon reads:
‘In assessing the similarity of the goods or services concerned . . . all the relevant
factors relating to those goods or services themselves should be taken into
account. Those factors include, inter alia, their nature, their end users and their
method of use and whether they are in competition with each other or are
complementary.’
Canon was decided under art 4(1)(b) of First Council Directive 89/104/
EEC of 21 December 1988 to approximate the laws of the Member States
relating to trade marks ((1989) OJ L 40 at 1), which provides:
‘A trade mark shall not be registered or, if registered, shall be liable to be
declared invalid if because of its identity with, or similarity to, the earlier trade mark and
the identity or similarity of the goods or services covered by the trade marks, there exists a
likelihood of confusion on the part of the public, which includes the likelihood of
association with the earlier trade mark.’ (My emphasis.)
The italicised wording is identical to that of art 8(1)(b) of the Council
Regulation on the community mark, quoted in full above. Thus its
interpretation was applied by the CFI in its assessment of the similarity
between wine and wine glasses. In paras 30–5 of its judgment (supra) the CFI
then proceeded to consider the factors listed in para 23 of Canon (supra).
First, the CFI pointed out that wine and wine glasses ‘are distinct by nature
and by their use, that they are neither in competition with one another nor
substitutable and are not produced in the same areas’ (supra para 31, my emphasis).
It then held that although wine and wine glasses are sometimes sold together,
this occurred to a negligible extent with limited commercial signiﬁcance, and
it was not generally considered an indication that the goods originated from
the same supplier (supra paras 32–3; Giuseppe Bertoli ‘Advances and halts in
the recent case-law of the CFI concerning the community trade mark’ (2009)
9 ERA Forum 609 at 616). Finally, the CFI held that although the goods were
complementary, that ‘complementarity was not sufﬁciently pronounced’ to
render the goods similar because wine could be drunk from ‘other vessels’
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and wine glasses could be used for other purposes (supra para 34). In other
words, the goods were not dependent on each other. Complementary goods
will only be found to be similar where they are indispensable to each other
(Leanne Mostert op cit; Mülhens GmbH & Co KG v OHIM (TOSCA BLU)
Case T-150/04 [2007] ECR II-2353 para 38; Bertoli op cit at 615).
The CFI did not proceed to compare the relevant marks as the crucial
ﬁnding of similarity between the goods had not been made. It simply
concluded in para 35 that:
‘Having regard to all of the foregoing, it must be held that articles of glassware
and wine are not similar goods. Consequently, there can be no likelihood of
confusion between the conﬂicting marks and the applicant’s second plea must
therefore be accepted.’
Waterford Wedgwood then appealed against the CFI’s decision to the ECJ
in August 2007. As noted earlier, judgment was handed down on 7 May
2009. The following section outlines and discusses the ECJ’s decision.
THE ECJ DECISION
Waterford Wedgwood had two grounds of appeal. First, it argued that the
CFI used the wrong test or approach in assessing the similarity of wine and
wine glasses because it failed to consider the distinctiveness of the earlier
mark (supra paras 21–22). Secondly, it contended that the CFI had not relied
on ‘any evidential basis’ and had thus distorted the facts on which it relied
to make a ﬁnding of a lack of similarity between the goods (supra paras 20
and 37).
In ruling on the ﬁrst ground of appeal, the ECJ began by emphasising the
signiﬁcance of establishing the similarity between the goods, since this is the
key ﬁrst step in interpreting and applying art 8(1)(b). It noted that even where
the marks in question are identical and the earlier mark is highly distinctive,
‘it is still necessary to adduce evidence of similarity between the goods or
services’ (supra para 34). The ECJ emphasised that the distinctiveness of the
earlier mark was not relevant to the assessment of similarity between the
goods, and only became relevant in the enquiry into the probability of
confusion among consumers (supra paras 31–2 and 35). The ECJ did not
carry out its own assessment of similarity between wine and wine glasses but
merely noted in paras 35 and 43 of its judgment that the CFI had carried out a
comprehensive assessment using the considerations listed in para 23 of Canon
(supra). The ECJ did not expressly address the signiﬁcance of the comple-
mentarity between wine and wine glasses. It simply afﬁrmed the CFI’s
approach as the proper approach and upheld the CFI’s ﬁnding that the goods
were not similar.
The ECJ explained that the enquiry into possible confusion will only be
conducted after similarity between both the goods or services and the marks
in issue has been established. It is at that stage that the interdependence of the
two earlier assessments will become relevant. The ECJ explained this
interdependence as follows in paras 32–4:
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‘[M]arks with a highly distinctive character, either per se or because of the
recognition of them on the market, enjoy broader protection than marks with a
less distinctive character (see Canon, paragraph 18, and Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer,
paragraph 20). It follows that there may be a likelihood of confusion,
notwithstanding a low degree of similarity between the trade marks, where the
goods or services covered by them are very similar and the earlier mark is highly
distinctive (see, to that effect, Canon, paragraph 19, and Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer,
paragraph 21). However, the interdependence of those different factors does not mean that
the complete lack of similarity can be fully offset by the strong distinctive character of the
earlier trade mark.’ (My emphasis.)
Factoring in this interdependence is also referred to as the global
appreciation approach. This approach is not discussed in this note because it
was not applied by the ECJ — it was not necessary for the court to do so.
There was no need to proceed either to the comparison of the marks or to an
assessment of the likelihood of confusion, because the goods were found to
be neither similar nor identical. There was thus no opportunity to consider
interdependence.
With regard to the second ground of appeal, the ECJ held that appeals can
only be brought on points of law. It has no jurisdiction to appraise facts and
evidence adjudicated on by the CFI unless those facts or evidence have been
distorted (supra para 40). The ECJ held that Waterford Wedgwood had
neither shown nor proved that the CFI had distorted the facts (supra para 42).
The court found that Waterford Wedgwood had simply alleged that the CFI
had not ‘adequately reason[ed] its decision’ (supra paras 31 and 43). The ECJ
found that the CFI had in fact adequately reasoned its decision and had
‘carried out a detailed comparative assessment of the goods in question’ (supra
para 45). The court therefore held that the facts had not been distorted (para
46), and the appeal was therefore dismissed in its entirety.
In summary, a three-stage approach emerges from the CFI’s judgment,
which was endorsed by the ECJ. The ﬁrst stage is an assessment of whether
the goods or services are similar or identical. Such an assessment considers the
nature, use, and users of the goods and services, and any competition and
complementarity between the goods or services. Complementary goods will
be similar where they are indispensable to each other. If the goods or services
are similar or identical, an assessment of the similarity between the relevant
marks will be conducted. If the marks are also similar or identical, the
possibility of confusion among consumers will then be evaluated. The
distinctiveness of the earlier mark then acquires added signiﬁcance as it may
offset low levels of similarity between the goods or services. South African
courts will ﬁnd the ECJ’s position as enunciated in this judgment to be of
great relevance because our legislation has similar provisions, as will be
shown below (cf Mostert loc cit).
THE SOUTH AFRICAN POSITION
South African courts expressly follow the ECJ’s case law when dealing with
similar matters (see Klimax Manufacturing Ltd & another v Van Rensburg &
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another 2005 (4) SA 445 (O) para 27). Section 10(14) of the South African
Trade Marks Act 194 of 1993 provides that a mark is not capable of
registration if it is similar to an earlier mark and both marks are used or are to
be used in relation to similar goods, and if there is a likelihood of confusion
among consumers. It uses wording very similar to that of art 8(1)(b) and
provides:
‘Subject to the provisions of section 14, a mark which is identical to a registered
trade mark belonging to a different proprietor or so similar thereto that the use
thereof in relation to goods or services in respect of which it is sought to be
registered and which are the same as or similar to the goods or services in
respect of which such trade mark is registered, would be likely to deceive or
cause confusion, unless the proprietor of such trade mark consents to the
registration of such mark.’
This section may be used to oppose the registration of a trade mark under
s 21 of the Trade Marks Act (C E Webster and G E Morley Webster and Page:
South African Law of Trade Marks 4 ed (1997) para 8.31 (hereafter Webster and
Page)). There is no case law on such use of s 10(14). However, Danco Clothing
v Nu-Care Marketing Sales and Promotions 1991 (4) SA 850 (A), which
concerned the interpretation of s 17(1) of the former Trade Marks Act 62 of
1963, is relevant. Section 17(1) was the predecessor of s 10(14) and was a
ground for opposition and expungement under the 1963 Act (Webster and
Page para 8.13). It provided:
‘Subject to the provisions of sub-s (2), no trade mark shall be registered if it so
resembles a trade mark belonging to a different proprietor and already on the
register that the use of both such trade marks in relation to goods or services in
respect of which they are sought to be registered, and registered, would be
likely to deceive or cause confusion.’
This wording is obviously different from that of s 10(14) of the 1993 Act
and art 8(1)(b) of the EU Council Regulation on the community mark.
However, it contemplates and regulates the same situation. Webster and Page
notes that s 10(14) of the 1993 Act retained the phrase ‘likely to deceive or
cause confusion’ and argues that the tests for similarity under both sections
should be the same (para 6.11). Therefore, the principles laid down by the
court in Danco (supra) are relevant to this discussion. To place these principles
in context, a brief outline of the facts follows.
Danco Clothing had registered the mark ‘French Connection’ in class 25
for ‘articles of clothing for women and girls’ and ‘articles of clothing of all
kinds’ in 1980 and 1983 respectively (supra at 856). These marks gained a
substantial reputation and in June 1988 Danco Clothing applied for the
registration of the same mark in class 3 for ‘soaps, perfumery, essential oils,
toiletries, deodorants, cosmetics, hair lotions and hair care products of all
kinds; sun-tan preparations; dentriﬁces’ (supra at 857). Prior to lodging its
application for registration, Danco Clothing discovered that Nu-Care had
registered an identical mark (‘French Connection’) in class 3 in 1985. Danco
unsuccessfully attempted to purchase rights to that mark from Nu-Care
(supra at 856–7). In November 1988 Danco Clothing then brought an
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application to have Nu-Care’s trade mark expunged on the grounds that it
should not have been registered in 1985 as this registration contravened
s 17(1). The court therefore had to determine whether Nu-Care’s use of the
mark in relation to cosmetics would probably cause confusion when
compared to Danco Clothing’s use of the mark in relation to clothing (Gavin
E Morley ‘Containers, scent and clothing’ (1991–1992) Managing Intellectual
Property 24 at 25). If so, Nu-Care’s mark would have to be expunged. In this
case there was no need to compare the marks as they were identical. Once
similarity between the goods was established the court could proceed to
consider the probability of confusion as to the origin of the goods.
In comparing cosmetics and clothing the court considered their nature,
use and distribution channels (Webster and Page para 6.12). First, the court
noted that the goods were ‘accommodated in different classes on the register’
and were ‘of a widely divergent nature’ (supra at 860). However, they were
to be considered similar because they were ‘sold, according to the undisputed
evidence, in close proximity, through the same trade channels’ and it has
been established through expert testimony that ‘customers in retail outlets of
this sort would as a matter of course associate a mark on cosmetics with the
identical mark on well known and popular brands of clothing’ (supra at 860).
The court therefore concluded as follows (supra at 861, my emphasis):
‘Having regard to the evidence relating to the nature of the goods (the
appellant’s clothing and the respondent’s cosmetics), their respective use, and
the trade channels through which the appellant’s and the respondent’s goods can
notionally be retailed, the likelihood of deception or confusion amongst a
substantial number of persons has, in my opinion, been established on the
probabilities.’
The court held that Nu-Care’s mark should be expunged.
Three comments may be made about the Danco decision. First, the case
exempliﬁes our courts’ approach to the comparison of complementary goods
under s 17(1) of the 1963 Act. The same approach will probably be used to
determine cases brought under s 10(14) of the current Act. Webster and Page
(para 6.12) suggests that in appropriate cases other factors should be
considered, such as the users of the goods or services and the extent to which
they are competitive.
Secondly, the court did not expressly comment on the complementarity
between the goods, but this was implied in the court’s reference to their use.
This lack of emphasis on the signiﬁcance of the levels of complementarity is
markedly different from the European approach, which requires that
complementary goods be indispensable to each other to be considered
similar. As a result, the court reached a different result from the European
courts dealing with similar circumstances. For example, in Mülhens GmbH &
Co KG v OHIM (supra para 36, my emphasis) the CFI held that cosmetics
and clothing are not similar:
‘In order to give rise to a degree of similarity for the purposes of Article 8(1)(b)
of Regulation No 40/94, this aesthetically complementary nature must involve
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a genuine aesthetic necessity, in that one product is indispensable or important for the use
of the other and consumers consider it ordinary and natural to use these products together.’
Thirdly, the South African judgment did not set out the three-step test to
be used in such circumstances with as much detail and clarity as both the CFI
and ECJ did. European jurisprudence will thus be invaluable to our courts
when they next have occasion to adjudicate on such matters and to set out
the correct approach.
CONCLUSION
It therefore appears that while art 8(1)(b) of the EU Regulations on the
community mark and s 17(1) of the 1963 SouthAfrican Trade Marks Act are
similarly worded, their interpretation and application have led to different
results in cases involving complementary goods. In Europe, cosmetics and
clothing are considered dissimilar because they are not indispensable to each
other, while our courts have found them to be similar for trade mark
purposes.
It is possible to make an informed guess about what the outcome of the
Waterford Wedgwood case would have been if it had been before our courts
under s 10(14) of the 1993 Trade Marks Act. It is clear that, to assess
similarity, our courts would have used the same factors used in Danco (supra)
and suggested in Webster and Page, namely, the nature, use, users and trade
channels of the goods and services. The court’s probable ﬁnding would have
been that wine and wine glasses are of a divergent nature, as they are
accommodated in different classes and are used or consumed differently.
Furthermore, evidence placed before the European courts proved that wine
and wine glasses are not sold together to a signiﬁcant extent. There is no
reason why our courts would not have accepted the same evidence. On that
basis the goods would have been found to be dissimilar.
It is difﬁcult to predict how much emphasis our courts would have placed
on the complementarity between wine and wine glasses, as this aspect was
not discussed in Danco (supra). It is possible that they would have followed
the European approach and required indispensability to make a ﬁnding of
similarity. However, even without this aspect, I believe our courts would
have ruled that wine and wine glasses are not similar, based on their nature,
use, users and trade channels.
THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW JOURNAL58
4/10/2016 SHERPA/RoMEO - Search - Publisher copyright policies & self-archiving
http://www.sherpa.ac.uk/romeo/search.php 1/2
Journal: South African Law Journal (ISSN: 0038­2388, ESSN: 1996­2177)
RoMEO: This is a RoMEO white journal
Published by: Juta Law ­ White Policies in RoMEO
 
. . . opening access
to research  
 
Search ­ Publisher copyright policies & self­
archiving
 
One journal found when searched for: south african law journal
Author's Pre­
print:
  author cannot archive pre­print (ie pre­refereeing)
Author's Post­
print:
  author cannot archive post­print (ie final draft post­refereeing)
Publisher's
Version/PDF:
  subject to Restrictions below, author can archive publisher's version/PDF
Restrictions:
6 months embargo
General
Conditions: On institutional repository affiliated with the author
Publisher's version/PDF must be used
On a non­profit server
Publisher copyright and source must be acknowledged with citation
Must link to publisher version
Mandated OA: (Awaiting information)
Copyright: Not available online
Updated: 01­May­2014 ­ Suggest an update for this record
Link to this
page:
http://www.sherpa.ac.uk/romeo/issn/0038­2388/
This summary is for the journal's default policies, and changes or exceptions can often be
negotiated by authors.
All information is correct to the best of our knowledge but should not be relied upon for
legal advice.
 
RoMEO
Colour
Archiving policy
Green Can archive pre­print and post­print or
publisher's version/PDF
Blue Can archive post­print (ie final draft post­
refereeing) or publisher's version/PDF
Yellow Can archive pre­print (ie pre­refereeing)
White Archiving not formally supported
  More on colours and restrictions
or View all publishers
Use this site to find a summary of permissions that are normally given as part of each publisher's
copyright transfer agreement.
4/10/2016 SHERPA/RoMEO - Search - Publisher copyright policies & self-archiving
http://www.sherpa.ac.uk/romeo/search.php 2/2
© 2006­2016, University of Nottingham Contact us
The RoMEO Journals database is supplemented with information kindly provided by:
­ the British Library's Zetoc service hosted by MIMAS,
­ the Directory of Open Access Journals (DOAJ) managed by Infrastructure Services for Open
Access,
­ the Entrez journal list hosted by the NCBI.
